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This is a reply to Michael Nauenberg’s arXiv:1502.00123, to be published in the
American Journal of Physics, in which he comments critically on our paper “An
introduction to QBism with an application to the locality of quantum mechanics”,
Am. J. Phys. 82, 749–754 (2014) and arXiv:1311.5253.
Although the meaning of the quantum state (“ψ”) seems evident to Michael Nauenberg,
among the physicists and philosophers interested in quantum foundations, there continues
to be broad and irreconcilable disagreement even after 90 years. Can these 90 years of
widespread confusion have something to do with almost all physicists taking for granted the
frequentist interpretation of probability? It seems a possibility worth considering.
The subjective view of probability, dating back to Laplace, and eloquently advocated by
B. de Finetti, L. J. Savage, R. Jeffrey, and many others, is introduced on our first page.
QBism explores what such an understanding of probability implies for the interpretation
of quantum mechanics. Our assertion (“without any justification”) further along the page,
beginning “since probabilities are the personal judgements of an agent. . .”, refers back to
the premise of subjective probability, whose implications we are about to examine.
An immediate consequence is that the quantum state an agent assigns to a system de-
pends on what the agent believes about that system. This is not unique to QBism. That
different agents can assign different states is the point of Wigner’s famous parable about
his friend. The probabilities determined by the Born rule are contingent on the state as-
signment, whether one understands those probabilities from a subjectivist or frequentist
perspective. Any experiment that validates or invalidates the standard link between the
Born rule and the state assignment for a frequentist does so for a subjectivist too.
QBism is not about the validity of quantum mechanics, but about how to understand the
basic concepts that appear in the theory: states, probabilities, measurements, outcomes. Is
the state of a system an objective fact about that system (as Nauenberg seems to believe)
or is it a judgment made by a particular agent on the basis of her prior experience of that
system (the QBist view)? Is the outcome of a measurement a permanent record of an
experiment made “by a macroscopic and time irreversible process”, or is it the personal
experience induced in an agent by the response of her external world to any action she takes
upon it?
Frequencies are indeed ubiquitous in physics. But the subjective theory of probability
2distinguishes between frequencies and probabilities. Frequencies are data; probabilities are
personal degrees of belief. Frequencies can be assigned probabilities. And probabilities can
be refined in the light of subsequently measured frequencies. A famous theorem of de Finetti
relates the two.
Nauenberg misses a central point of QBism in his criticism of our discussion of nonlocality.
Events are deductions an agent makes to account for her experience. The correlations each
agent extracts from quantum mechanics are not between disembodied “events”, but between
the experiences (outcomes of her actions on the world) from which she constructs such events.
Nauenberg concludes that “Contrary to Fuchs et al., quantum theory deals with the
objective world as directly as does classical mechanics”. Setting aside our doubts about
his “essential difference” between classical and quantum mechanics, we only remark that
the QBist understanding of science applies to classical as well as quantum physics. Unlike
QBism, CBism is not needed to resolve a scandalous incoherence at the foundations of the
subject, but it does succeed in clearing up at least one long-standing puzzle [1].
QBism is a genuinely novel way of thinking about the function of science. It raises subtle
questions about the nature of science, the nature of human experience, and the relation of
scientists to each other and to the world they are attempting to understand. We welcome
criticism, but urge critics to pay some attention to what we are saying.
[1] N. David Mermin, “QBism puts the scientist back into science”, Nature 507, 421–423
(2014).
